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Sacrificed Sovereignty?: Dutch Soft Drug 
Policy in the Spectre of Europe Without 
Borders 
INTRODUCTION 
For the past two decades, the Netherlands has had a reputation as 
being a Western European "mecca" for drug users and drug traffick-
ers. I This reputation may be somewhat undeserved; Dutch laws govern-
ing drug trafficking and the consumption of "hard drugs" are at least 
as stringent as those of other European Union (EU)2 nations.3 None-
theless, the Netherlands' reputation for liberalism toward drug use is 
a direct result of its relatively permissive policy toward the consumption 
of "soft drugs."4 
Although studies indicate that the Dutch policy toward soft drug 
consumption is successful in terms of demand reduction and public 
health aspects,5 the Netherlands is under increasing pressure to har-
monize its laws with those of its neighbors given the impending elimi-
nation of internal border controls throughout the EU created by both 
the Maastricht TreatY' and the Schengen Agreement? If the resultant 
Single Market creates the anticipated free movement of goods and 
I A.M. van Kalmthout, Characteristics of Dutch Drug Policy in the Netherlands, in DRUG POLICIES 
IN WESTERN EUROPE 259, 260. (Hans-Jorg Albrecht & Anton van Kalmthout eds., 1989). 
2 The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) when the Treaty on 
European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, came into force in November, 1993. See 
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992,31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter MAASTRICHT TREATY]. For 
purposes of consistency, this Note will refer to all pre-November 1993 EC activity as EU activity. 
3 See van Kalmthout, supra note 1, at 262-63, 266. "Hard drugs" are defined as those, such as 
heroin and cocaine, that carry "unacceptable risks"; "soft drugs" are defined as traditional hemp 
products like marijuana and hashish. ld. at 263. 
4 See id. 
51d. at 265 n.ll. 
6 MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2; See O. Anjewierden and J.M.A. van Atteveld, Current 
Trends in Dutch opium Legislation, in DRUG POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 235, 
238. 
7 Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, June 
14, 1985, Belg.-Dr.-F.R.G.-Lux.-Neth., 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991) [hereinafter Schengen Agreement]. 
Under the Schengen Agreement, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
agreed to the gradual abolition of controls at their common frontiers. ld. art. 18. 
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people across borders, activities such as international drug trafficking 
could also increase.8 Thus, the Netherlands faces heavy pressure 
to make its policies toward soft drugs conform to those of the rest of 
the EU.9 
Part I of this Note examines the international agreements which 
create pressure on the Netherlands to harmonize its soft drug policies 
with other EU nations. Part II discusses the Dutch drug laws at issue. 
Part III discusses different options the Netherlands might take in the 
interest of harmonization, and which course would be the best for the 
Netherlands. This Note concludes that, while the Netherlands' ideal 
solution would be to encourage other EU nations to adopt the success-
ful Dutch policy toward soft drugs, the Netherlands will probably take 
the simpler route of compromising its own policy to achieve harmoni-
zation with the policies of its neighbors. 
1. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE ELIMINATION OF INTERNAL 
BORDER CONTROLS 
A. The Maastricht Treaty 
The Maastricht Treaty, known formally as the "Treaty on European 
Union," went into force on November 1, 1993.10 The treaty purported 
to create a single European market, featuring the free movement of 
people, goods, and workers across internal borders within the EU.u 
Article 8A(1) of the Maastricht Treaty states: "Every citizen of the 
Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the terri-
tory of the member states, subject to the limitations and conditions 
laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect."12 
8 See Hannah G. Sevenster, Criminal Law andEC Law, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 29,59 (1992). 
9 See Henk van Vliet, The Uneasy Decriminalization: A Perspective on Dutch Drug Policy, IS 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 717, 717-1S, 743 (1990). Other Member States, particularly Germany, feel that 
the Netherlands will be a convenient supply station for individuals who wish to take advantage 
of open borders, bringing their wares into these other states. Id., Roger Boyes, Marijuana Smoke 
Drifts Through open Market's Gaps, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 17, 1993, available in LEXlS, 
Europe Library, Ttimes File. 
10 See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. R. 
II See id., pt. 2, art. SA(1). The European Union, which consists of the signees to the Maastricht 
Treaty, includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Great Britain. Id., pmbl. 
12Id. 
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Article Kl of the Maastricht Treaty qualifies this particular objective 
in regard to drug trafficking.13 Article Kl establishes judicial coopera-
tion in criminal matters as a "matter of common interest" between the 
Member States for the "purposes of achieving the objectives of the 
Union, in particular the free movement of persons."14 
In addition, article 100 of the Treaty, dealing with the approximation 
of laws, states: 
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission and after consulting the European Parlia-
ment and the Economic and Social Committee, issue direc-
tives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or ad-
ministrative provisions of the member states as directly affect 
the establishment or functioning of the common market. 15 
Thus, according to the text of the Treaty, if the European Councip6 
can establish that the leniency of one nation's laws adversely affects the 
"establishment or functioning of the common market," it can issue a 
directive that expressly creates a conflicting EU law with the power to 
issue sanctions if the dissenting nation does not comply.17 Taking all of 
these provisions into consideration, if the Maastricht Treaty does not 
have the explicit ability to force the Netherlands to conform its soft 
drug policies to those of the other nations of the EU, it at least 
expresses the desire for harmonization of criminal laws, which would 
ostensibly include Dutch drug laws. IS 
13 [d. art. Kl (9). 
14 [d. art Kl. 
15 [d. art. 100. 
16 See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, tit. I, art. D. The European Council (EC), which is 
established in Title I, article D of the Maastricht Treaty, establishes the EC, which is comprised 
of the heads of state of each Member State, as well as the President of the European Commission. 
[d. The Council meets twice a year and issues reports to the European Parliament (the legislative 
body in the EU), setting priorities and political guidelines for the EU. [d. 
17 See id. It is unclear whether the Council has the power to impose sanctions in the event of 
noncompliance with a directive if the directive does not relate to competition law. See Sevenster, 
supra note 8, at 33-35. Article 172 of the Maastricht Treaty reads: "Regulations made by the 
Council pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty may give the Court of Justice unlimited juris-
diction in regard to the penalties provided for in such regulations." MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra 
note 2, art. 172. Sanctions are only mentioned, however, in the article relating to competition 
law; thus it is uncertain whether or not article 172 gives the European Court of Justice (also 
created by the Maastricht Treaty) a broad competence to impose sanctions, or simply the power 
to impose sanctions for violation of competition laws. Sevenster, supra note 8, at 33. 
18 See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. Kl. 
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B. The Schengen Agreement 
On June 14, 1985, Belgium, West Germany, France, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands concluded the Schengen Agreement, which called 
for the gradual abolition of border controls at the common frontiers 
of these states. 19 On June 19, 1990, the parties to the original agree-
ment concluded a convention to implement the agreement.20 The 
agreement contained detailed rules on the abolition of internal border 
checks of persons and was seen as a forerunner to the concept of "free 
movement of persons" expressed in the Maastricht Treaty.21 Under this 
agreement, 'Johann Schmidt [could] fly from Frankfurt to Athens as 
easily asJohn Doe flies from Boston to San Diego," once its provisions 
are solidly in place.22 
The Dutch policies toward soft drugs are implicitly challenged under 
the Schengen Agreement. 23 Article 19 specifically states: "The Parties 
shall seek to harmonize laws and regulations, in particular on: drugs, 
arms and explosives, registration of travellers in hotels. "24 While the 
text of this article does not directly address Dutch policies toward soft 
drugs, such policies are inconsistent with those of other nations; thus 
the Netherlands would seemingly bear the burden to conform.25 
While the Schengen Agreement was officially enacted in 1990, par-
ties to the agreement have not implemented all of its measures.26 The 
delay is a result of both technical difficulties between the parties and 
complaints by certain parties that border controls would be too lax to 
stop illegal immigration and the increase of drug trafficking.27 Full 
implementation of the Schengen Agreement's open borders provi-
sions, which had been scheduled for March 26, 1995, is curren tly being 
19 See Schengen Agreement, supra note 7, art. 18. 
20ld. at Introductory Note. 
21 Schengen Agreement, supra note 7, art. 18; Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 237-238. 
22 open to Us, Closed to Them, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Econ File. 
23 Schengen Agreement, supra note 7, art. 19. 
241d. 
25 See Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 238. In addition to discussing obligations placed upon the 
Dutch by the Schengen Agreement, Anjewierden also alludes to international pressure that was 
placed on the Netherlands before the Schengen Agreement was formulated. Id. It focuses 
primarily upon Swedish and West German criticism regarding the Dutch policy of permitting soft 
drug distributors to operate in youth houses under certain guidelines. Id. 
26 See Control of Individuals: 4.1 Current Position & Outlook, INFO-92, Aug. 3, 1994, available 
in LEXIS, Europe Library, Info-92 File [hereinafter Control of Individuals]. 
27 NineEC States Agree to Open Borders From December, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Service,June 
30, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Xinhua File. 
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blocked by France, which is particularly concerned about regional 
effects of Dutch soft drug policy.28 In response, the Dutch government 
is considering ways to strengthen its stance on soft drugs.29 
II. THE DUTCH POLICY TOWARD HARD AND SOFT DRUGS 
The first drug legislation enacted in the Netherlands was the Opium 
Act of 1919, which was amended in 1928 in an effort to promote 
compliance with the International Opium Treaty joined by the Neth-
erlands in 1925.30 The 1928 version of the Opium Act added cocaine 
to the list of prohibited drugs and penalized the import, export, and 
transit of hemp products (i.e. marijuana and hashish), which had not 
previously been subject to prohibition.31 The Opium Act was again 
toughened in 1953, when the maximum sentence for drug crimes was 
raised from one to four years imprisonment.32 At this time, the Nether-
lands made the possession and consumption of hemp products crimi-
nal offenses.33 The Opium Act was amended once again in 1976, with 
the demotion of possession of up to thirty grams of marijuana or 
hashish from an offense to a misdemeanor.34 
A. Dutch Drug Policy Today 
The Netherlands never codified its drug policy rules and regulations 
into a single body oflegislation.35 Instead, drug law is comprised of the 
current version of the Opium Act in addition to international treaties 
like the Schengen Agreement.36 The Schengen Agreement does not 
28 Minister Warns France Not to Blame NL for Own Drug Problems, ANP English News Bulletin, 
Sept. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
29 Abi Daruvalla, Liberal Dutch Finally Get Tough on Drugs, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 25, 1995, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. The government has abandoned a proposal to 
legalize cannabis outright, and has proposed a reduction of the amount of cannabis tolerated for 
personal use from 30 grams to five grams. Id. The government has also proposed shutting down 
half of the coffeeshops in Amsterdam and Rotterdam where soft drugs are openly available. Id. 
30 Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 235. Anjewierden demonstrates that the Netherlands does 
indeed have historical precedent for altering its drug policy to conform with international 
expectations. Id. 
3! Id. 
32Id. at n.3. The 1953 reforms came after the Netherlands ratified a Protocol in 1946 to 
toughen the International Opium Treaty, thus offering an example of Dutch willingness to adapt 
its drug policy to mesh with those of other countries. See id. 
33 Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 235-36. 
34Id. at 236; van Vliet, supra note 9, at 731. 
35Id. at 237. 
36Id. at 237-38; see also Schengen Agreement, supra note 7, art. 19. 
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explicitly call for the adoption of more stringent drug policies in 
the Netherlands, rather it calls for harmonization between Member 
States.37 
The Opium Act in its current form reflects the amendments of 
1976.38 Prior to the amendments, rather than fighting drug abuse, 
Dutch law focused on prohibition and penal measures, paying little 
attention to social, economic, and psychological problems accompany-
ing the use of hard drugs.39 Gradually doubts arose as to the efficacy 
of such a repressive and indiscriminate policy.40 Upon the subsequent 
recommendations of a multi-disciplinary committee investigating the 
existing policy, the Dutch legislature reworked the Opium Act to fo-
cus upon fighting the risks of drug abuse for individuals and society 
(rather than fighting consumption itself).4l Since the 1976 reform, 
Dutch drug policy has been based on three "pillars": 
1. Strict observation of the Opium Act as far as the manufac-
ture of or traffic in illicit drugs is concerned (notably hard 
drugs) and a strict observation of the Dutch Penal Code as 
far as drug related crimes are concerned; 
2. Not taking any action against possession of small quantities 
of soft or hard drugs for personal consumption, and tolerat-
ing the consumption of and traffic in soft drugs in certain 
youth centers; 
3. Offering a wide scale of support programs to addicts with 
the main object to prevent and relieve the risks of drug use 
for the addict, his immediate environment and society as a 
whole.42 
The policies expressed in the first pillar (hard drug policy) are just 
as stringent as those in other EU Member States.43 In fact, with the 
37 See Schengen Agreement, supra note 7, art. 19. 
38 See van Kalmthout, supra note 1, at 263-64. 
39Id. at 261. While ignoring the social, economic, and psychological problems associated with 
hard drugs, Dutch law did not yet differentiate between hard and soft drugs. Id. 
40Id. at 261-62. 
41Id. at 261-63; van Vliet, supra note 9, at 724-25. van Vliet discusses the Dutch Government's 
strategy of separating the soft drug market from the hard drug market in order to remove the 
sale and consumption of marijuana and hashish from the hard drug scene. Id. This would 
conceivably prevent experimenting youth from getting caught up with the dangerous criminal 
element present in the hard drug culture. Id. 
42van Kalmthout, supra note 1, at 262. 
43Id. at 266. 
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1976 reforms, hard drug sentencing in the Netherlands increased to 
bring penalties into line with Western European standards.44 For ex-
ample, sentencing for heroin and cocaine trade increased from a 
maximum of four years imprisonment to a maximum of twelve years 
and/or a fine of 100,000 guilders.45 
Interestingly, hemp products have not been decriminalized per se in 
the Netherlands.46 Since the 1976 Opium Act reforms, possession of 
up to thirty grams of hemp product is considered a misdemeanor and 
is subject to a maximum penalty of one month's imprisonment and/or 
a minimal fineY These penalties, however, are almost never enforced 
due to the "expediency principle" featured in Dutch criminal law. 48 
Under the "expediency principle," the Public Prosecutions Depart-
ment49 may refrain from prosecuting certain offenses "on grounds 
derived from the public interest."5o In order to prevent the Prosecu-
tions Department from exhausting its resources on minor hemp pos-
session offenses, the Ministry of Justice has a set of guidelines to 
determine which offenses warrant criminal action under the Opium 
Act.51 The Ministry of Justice prioritizes import, export, and trafficking 
of hard and soft drugs, while it relegates personal possession and 
consumption of drugs, particularly soft drugs, to the lowest priority 
level,52 Generally, the possession of less than thirty grams of hemp 
product in the Netherlands will not be investigated or prosecuted.53 
The Ministry of Justice guidelines also designate a certain type of 
soft drug dealer as being immune from prosecution.54 This type of 
dealer, known as a "kokerjuJJer' or "house dealer," is an individual who, 
44Id. 
45Id. (citing Opium Acts, sec. 10 par. 4 (1976) (Ned.». 100,000 guilders is roughly equivalent 
to $58,000 in U.S. currency. Telephone conversation with Business Desk of the BOSTON GLOBE 
(Oct. 17, 1994). 
46 van Vliet, supra note 9, at 731. As in most other nations, marijuana and hashish are still 
considered controlled substances in the Netherlands. Id. 
47Id. 
48 van Kalmthout, supra note 1, at 264. 
49 The Public Prosecutions Department is essentially the Dutch equivalent of a District Attor-
ney's Office. See van Vliet, supra note 9, at 731. 
50Id. 
5! Id. 
52 Id.; see also Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 243. 
53 van Vliet, supra note 9, at 731. A current government proposal calls for a reduction in the 
tolerable amount to five grams. Daruvalla, supra note 29. 
54 van Vliet, supra note 9, at 731. 
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"trusted by and working under the protection of the staff of a youth 
center-gets the opportunity to sell cannabis products in that youth 
center to the exclusion of others."55 The guidelines provide that this 
type of dealer will only be prosecuted "when he publicly projects 
himself as a dealer or runs his business provokingly in other ways. "56 
The kokerjuffer is one of two types of unprosecuted soft drug dealers 
that have developed as a result of the policy of separating the soft drug 
market from the hard drug marketY 
"Coffeeshop" proprietors have also emerged as quasi-legal dealers 
that sell small amounts of soft drugs to their customers.58 Although 
these coffeeshops are technically forbidden from advertising their prod-
uct, they are readily identifiable by provocative names like "Outer 
Limits," "Stoneage," and "Stairway to Heaven," and by window signs 
bearing the distinctive cannabis leaf.59 The coffeehouse drug trade is 
precisely what is causing concern for other members of the EU.60 
For example, because of open borders, a foreign youth could enter 
a coffeeshop in Amsterdam, ask for the "alternative menu," pay for a 
"takeaway bag" of Moroccan hashish in Deutschmarks, and bring it 
back across an unpatrolled border into his home state, where soft drug 
possession is still considered a serious crime.61 Consequently, nations 
like Germany and France argue that with the elimination of internal 
border controls the Dutch policy makes it more difficult for them to 
enforce their own laws.62 Thus, the Netherlands faces an internal de-
bate over how to help harmonize drug legislation within the EU. 
III. ANALYSIS-DIFFERENT OPTIONS FOR THE NETHERLANDS 
A. Conformity 
The most obvious route toward harmonization of drug laws within 
the EU would be for the Netherlands to adopt the soft drug policies 
55Id. at 731-32, citing MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSE-
CUTION POLICY REGARDING OFFENSES UNDER THE OPIUM ACT, reprinted in STAATSCOURANT,July 
18, 1980, at 65. 
56Id. at 732. 
57Id. 
58 van Vliet, supra note 9, at 733-34; Boyes, supra note 9. 
59 van Vliet, supra note 9, at 735; Marlise Simons, Maastricht Journal: Drug Floodgates open, 
Inundating the Dutch, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, NIT File. 
6() See Boyes, supra note 9. 
61Id. 
62 See id. 
1996] SACRIFICED SOVEREIGNTY 181 
that other Member States presently observe.63 This would be a simple 
way for the ED to establish 'Judicial cooperation in criminal matters" 
as called for by the Maastricht Treaty.64 Such a path would also satisfY 
the harmonization requirement in the Schengen Agreement.65 
Some indicators show that as a result of international pressure, 
particularly on the part of Germany and France, the Netherlands may 
already be headed in this direction. 66 One example of the Netherlands' 
willingness to sacrifice its liberal soft drug policies in the face of 
international criticism is the case of the "Hash-museum" in Amster-
dam.67 This museum, opened in 1986, displayed various types of drugs 
and the instruments needed to use them.68 Although Amsterdam law 
enforcement authorities were unable to find anything illegal about the 
act of operating such a museum, the Minister of Justice, in an interna-
tionally publicized press conference, called for the closing of the mu-
seum.69 The Justice Minister's action seemed to be intended as a cos-
metic response to international criticism; the Justice Minister took no 
action against the many coffeehouses situated nearby and the museum 
reopened as soon as the uproar died down. 70 
Another example of the Netherlands' willingness to alter aspects of 
its drug policy in the face of international criticism is a 1985 amend-
ment to the Opium Act criminalizing "preparatory acts" with regard 
to drug offenses.71 Preparatory acts are defined as procuring drugs, as 
well as provoking, helping, or providing an individual with the oppor-
tunity to commit a drug offense. 72 Preparatory acts also include having 
63 See van Vliet, supra note 9, at 746. van Vliet notes that, on a special commission created in 
1985 by the European Parliament to study the drug problem, a majority of the members sup-
ported a "drug-free Europe" while the minority sought the "normalization of drug problems and 
the reduction of drug use" (most likely using Dutch methods of separating the soft drug market 
from the more troublesome hard drug market). [d. 
64 See MAASTRICHT 'TREATY, supra note 2, art. K.l (7). 
65 See Schengen Agreement, supra note 7, art. 19. 
66 Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 238; van Vliet, supra note 9, at 743-44. According to van Vliet, 
the German government, through "economic power-play" and "salami-tactics," and backed by 
an anti-Dutch public opinion, has stimulated a tightening in Dutch policy toward soft drugs since 
1985. van Vliet, supra note 9, at 743-44. Anjewierden also speaks of "a growing tendency to submit 
to foreign pressure." Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 238. 
67 van Vliet, supra note 9, at 735-36; Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 240. 
68 Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 240. 
69 van Vliet, supra note 9, at 735-36. 
70 Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 240. 
71 /d. at 242 (citing Opium Acts, sec. lOa). 
72 [d. 
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available means of transport, objects, substances, or funds which the 
suspect should have known would be used to commit a drug offense.73 
This amendment has been heavily criticized in the Netherlands.74 Its 
detractors claim that it is not really in keeping with Dutch criminal 
justice. Consequently, they argue that it must be meant as a conciliatory 
gesture to countries critical of Dutch drug policy.75 
Finally, the Dutch government is currently considering proposals to 
reduce the amount of marijuana and hashish tolerated for personal 
use from thirty grams to five grams. In conjunction with that proposal, 
the government is contemplating cutting in half the number of cof-
feeshops currently operating in the Netherlands.76 At the same time, 
the government has abandoned a proposal to decriminalize cannabis 
products.77 
Despite these signs of a toughening stance toward soft drugs, official 
Dutch policy remains essentially the same. Whether or not the Neth-
erlands will completely transform its soft drug policy in order to help 
achieve harmonization among Schengen nations and in the EU re-
mains unclear. While the Dutch government has shown a willingness 
to bend in the face of international criticism,78 Dr. Theo van Iwaarden, 
head of the Alcohol, Drugs and Tobacco Policy Department in the 
Health Ministry claims that the Netherlands "will never accept a har-
monization of drugs policy throughout the EU if it involves a step 
backwards from our current situation. "79 
B. Promotion oj Dutch Policy Throughout the EU 
As opposed to adapting its soft drug policies to agree with the more 
repressive policies of other Member States, the Netherlands could 
instead attempt to convince these other States that Dutch policies are 
serious, successful, and worth examining for use elsewhere.80 The evi-
dence shows that the Dutch policy toward soft drugs has indeed worked.8! 
Various studies demonstrate that, since the liberalization and de facto 
legalization of soft drug consumption in 1976, the use of soft drugs 
73Id. 
74Id. at 242-43. 
75 Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 242-43. 
76 Daruvalla, supra note 29. 
77Id. 
78 See Anjewierden, supra note 6, at 240, 242. 
79Id. 
80 See van Vliet, supra note 9, at 743-44. 
81 van Kalmthout, supra note 1, at 265. 
1996] SACRIFICED SOVEREIGNTY 183 
has decreased substantially.82 The numbers of young people, in particu-
lar, have fallen with respect to soft drug use.83 Furthermore, with the 
separation of the hard and soft drug markets and the consequent 
"normalization" of soft drug use, marijuana and hashish users rarely 
turn to more dangerous drugs.84 The problem of Dutch youth becom-
ing involved in heavy drug use or the drug-crime connection is thus 
very limited.8s Health, crime, and public order problems associated 
with drug use apply mainly to the "old" addict group, defined as 
individuals addicted to hard drugs prior to the 1976 reforms, as well 
as heroin-dependent prostitutes and foreign addicts.86 
Nonetheless, indicators also exist suggesting that the Dutch policy 
toward soft drugs is not as successful as its proponents might assert, 
particularly from an international perspective. For example, the per-
missive rules on soft drugs draw many foreign "drug tourists" to the 
Netherlands who bring their hard drug problems with them.87 Police 
in border towns such as Maastricht, Heerlen and Arnhem complain 
that eighty percent of their time is taken up by drug-related crimes 
that serve largely to pay for foreigners' drug needs.88 
While the burden placed on Dutch society by foreign addicts is seen 
by some as a reason for the Netherlands to tighten its policy toward 
soft drugs, others believe that this supports a strong argument for other 
nations to liberalize their own drug laws.89 In a report to the European 
Commission in February, 1994, Commission member Marco Taradash 
of Italy questioned the efficacy of repression and requested that con-
sumption and possession for personal consumption of small amounts 
of illegal drugs be decriminalized throughout the ED.90 Other mem-
82Id. The author cites two studies in making this assertion: Cannabis Consumption in the 
Netherlands (a 1984 Ministry of Justice study) and Twenty Years of Soft Drug Use in the Netherlands 
(a retrospective from prevalence studies), an independent study conducted by DJ. Korf in 1988. Id. 
at n.ll. 
83Id. In 1976. three percent of youths between the ages ofl5 and 16 and 10% of those between 
16 and 17 occasionally used soft drugs; by 1983, these figures were two percent and six percent 
respectively. Id. 
84 van Vliet, supra note 9, at 728. 
85Id. 
86Id. 
87 Simons, supra note 59. 
88Id. These "drug-related" crimes include car thefts, assaults, and burglaries. Id. 
89 See Edward Stourton, Breaking the Legal Habit: Is Legalisation the Only Choice Left in the War 
on Drugs?, GUARDIAN, Oct. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Guardn File. 
90 EU: Taradash Report Recommends Decriminalizing Personal Use of Soft Drugs, Reuters, Feb. 15, 
1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File. 
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bers of the Commission concurred, citing the failure of the interna-
tional "war on drugs" in support of their request.91 Commission members 
from the Netherlands felt strongly that the current policies throughout 
the EU put the Netherlands in an unfair position of having to support 
drug addicts from other states.92 
Nonetheless, the official position of the Commissioner, while ac-
knowledging international disagreement on this point, holds that de-
criminalization of consumption throughout the EU does not offer a 
viable solution to the European drug problem.93 Criminal matters still 
remain in the jurisdiction of the Member States.94 How this position 
will effect the Netherlands remains uncertain. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Netherlands faces a dilemma. It has an obligation under both 
the Maastricht Treaty and the Schengen Agreement to participate in a 
pan-European harmonization of drug legislation. Although the Neth-
erlands has no obligation to change its own laws, this may be the easiest 
solution. On one hand, the Dutch would have a much easier time 
unilaterally tightening their own soft drug policies than they would 
convincing the other EU and Schengen states to adapt theirs to con-
form with the Netherlands. 
Alternatively, the Netherlands' best interests lie in maintaining its 
liberal policies toward soft drug possession and consumption. The 
internal policies have arguably been successful. The main difficulties 
with the policies are attributable to drug addicts from neighboring 
states. Given its own domestic success, the optimal solution would be 
for the Netherlands to convince other States of the viability of its 
policies. This way the Dutch would neither jeopardize their own efforts 
at combatting drug problems and the other nations would embark on 
a more successful policy than those they have been using to this point. 
Unfortunately, while enlightenment of its neighbors would be the 
ideal policy for all concerned, the Netherlands is most likely to adopt 
91 ld. 
92 ld. Commission member Nel van Dijk of the Netherlands criticized those who accuse her 
country of "every evil as if the devil had a Dutch passport with the number 666," adding that the 
Netherlands cannot continue to "subsidize" drug addicts from other states. particularly Germany 
and Belgium. ld. 
93 ld. at 3. 
94 ld. 
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the policies of the other States. The Dutch have already shown a 
willingness to compromise aspects of their policy in the face of inter-
national pressure. Such pressure will no doubt increase as internal 
border controls continue to fall. Along with internal border controls, 
the de facto decriminalization of soft drugs in the Netherlands will waft 
away as well. 
Eric Thomas Berkman 
